Jack Gibson, University of Sydney
History in the Making, Vol 6 (December 2018)

Henry Alfred Kissinger is a man of two worlds. He is an intellectual, assimilated into American culture while simultaneously holding onto his European roots. One can see as much in his ideas on American foreign policy. On the one hand, he holds to the classic European conception of the balance of power. His thinking is informed greatly by 19^th Century figures such as Metternich. [1] At heart, then, he is a realist. Still, there is something about his thinking that is quintessentially American. He steps into that long line of traditional thought where America has a definitive role to play in shaping the world. [2] This duality, so to speak, was evident in his foreign policy ideas of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which will be the main focus of analysis in this essay. During this era of the Cold War, Kissinger as a thinker was a revolutionary force for the United States’ global affairs. For one, he understood the contemporary world to be multipolar. This marked a radical shift from the former United States perspective of a bipolar world defined by liberal capitalism against monolithic Communism. Additionally, Kissinger also began to formulate ideas pertaining to America’s limitations in its power and global reach. Thus he stressed multilateral action and encouraged greater autonomy for nations. All such arguments were based upon power politics, yet even then he also came to represent the status quo. To him, even with his realist approach, the United States had a major responsibility in world affairs and the balance of power. Like many before him, he could not escape the notion of America’s commitment to the world. Also inescapable was the more recent phenomenon of American credibility, whereby the United States could not afford to lose political face internationally. If this were to happen, there would be no shortage of nations ready to challenge its liberal order.

Consequently, in evaluating his ideas in the broader context of the history of American foreign policy, Kissinger comes off as more a ripple than a rupture. He is a peculiarity in this respect, and the same can be said of his influence. Obviously his immediate influence can be seen in the Nixon administration. This essay will focus on interrogating how the aforementioned ideas permeated Nixon’s rhetoric and constructed policy towards Vietnam and China. Following Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s presidency there was a period of pushback against Kissinger. This was best exemplified in Ronald Reagan with his resentment of Détente and coexistence. The same could be said of George W. Bush. It would seem that Kissinger’s influence was sporadic at best, until the arrival of president Barack Obama. Hence, despite his iconic status as a statesman, his ideas and influence in the history of American foreign policy came to be more or less a mixed bag.

Kissinger’s perspective on the contemporary Cold War era marked a dramatic turning point. For twenty odd years the basis of United States foreign policy was predicated on this dichotomy between Western liberalism and monolithic communism. Yet Kissinger argued that the bipolar superpower period was coming to a close by the 1960s, and in its place was “political multipolarity”. [3] This was due in no small part to the increase in the number of states upsetting the established order. These factors were “magnified” through national survival dependent on technological innovation. [4] For Kissinger, such technological progress presented a new means of obtaining power. Looking to Europe of the 19^th Century power was defined by territorial reach. Now power and security hinged on a country’s armaments, irrespective of landmass. [5] This was a sound judgment on his behalf. After all the Cuban Missile Crisis a few years earlier saw the United States’ national security being threatened by a nation significantly smaller in size, population and influence. This was because Cuba now had stockpiles of missiles. This conception of nuclear weaponry and power is drawn from classic power politics. His Realist perspective would be the backbone of his proposed solution. Domestic structure, Kissinger asserts, informs foreign policy. Therefore different domestic institutions would lead to a gulf between nations, with the possibility of conflict. [6] Effectively, attempts to pose United States hegemony over radically diverse nations would prove challenging. [7] In order to maintain a balance then, Kissinger suggested alliances formulated from a common purpose. [8]

The other important idea of this Cold War era to discuss is the limits of American power. Kissinger asserted that a long-term interest of the United States was a “pluralistic world”, especially pertaining to America’s allies. If America were to be the only “trustee” of non-communist regions then the nation would become exhausted. [9] This culminated in Kissinger’s later argument that an “institutionalized peace”, fostered by the United Nations, was the “spirit” of American Foreign Policy. [10] He wanted to see more multilateral action in international affairs. Far away from the belief that the United States should bear the full burden of world affairs in the name of liberty.

In spite of these novel approaches to American foreign policy, Kissinger nevertheless found himself entangled in conventional American thought. Kissinger called for a new concept of international order due to what he saw as the destruction of a traditional equilibrium under the Cold War. And for him, America was needed in this order. [11] The American National Myth was seeping into his ideas on foreign policy. Kissinger, like many before his time, believed America’s destiny was to play an important part on the international stage.

Jussi Hanhimäki, writing on Kissinger’s time as a statesman, did not find Kissinger’s policies “particularly innovative”, as they were based on “preconceived notions” of America in the world. [12] Of particular note was the idea of American credibility, to which Kissinger was prisoner. Following World War II the nation was now seen as the defender of liberty against the Communist menace. But this meant that the United States had found itself in a serious dilemma. If the superpower could not meet Communism at every point of the globe, as promised, then her reliability would be in serious question. Could America’s allies trust her to come to their aid? John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson struggled with this problem, resulting in the building up of American military force in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger shared their concern. He opposed anyone that brushed off American credibility as nothing more than an empty concept. [13] For him it was a serious issue.

Having analysed the American and European dynamic in Kissinger’s thinking, this essay will now move on consider how his more realist ideas have underscored American foreign policy initiatives. This will entail an analysis of key speeches and diplomatic actions with presidents Nixon, Reagan, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. What will become clear in the analysis is that beyond Nixon, Kissinger’s more pragmatic concepts lost their hold on the minds of new administrations. And in fact only under Obama was there a renaissance.

Being directly involved with the Nixon administration, there is no question that Henry Kissinger would have a significant impact. With Secretary of State Rogers cut out from any real policymaking it came down to both Nixon and Kissinger. The president was in many ways an “enabler” of his National Security Advisor. [14] Kissinger’s thinking on foreign policy was laced in President Richard Nixon’s rhetoric. In a report to Congress in 1970 Nixon notes that the pattern of international politics is changing. [15] This echoes Kissinger’s own views on the political pluralism across nations. More important in this speech however is his statement that the “fundamental interests” for nations is “building the structure of peace”. [16] Nixon adopted Kissinger’s arguments to find a common motive between nations for the preservation of international stability. He frames it in this case around peaceful global relations. His address following his re-election practically screams Kissinger as well. Of particular interest is Nixon’s remark that “the time has passed” for America to make all conflicts its own, likewise in informing another nation’s own affairs. [17] While not blatantly stated, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this is Nixon understanding, like Kissinger, the limits of American power. This remark also represents Kissinger’s assertion for other nations to take on greater responsibility. Much like Kissinger, Nixon too is swept away by grandiose ideas of America’s “indispensable role” in leading the world. [18] His comment on faith in the American nation points to concern over American prestige and credibility.

The reach of Henry A. Kissinger in the Nixon administration likewise instructed foreign policy. As much can be observed in the United States changing diplomatic relations to the People’s Republic of China and attitudes to Vietnam. The visit to China in early 1971 represented this shared understanding, between Nixon and Kissinger, of a fractured Communist world. As part of their Triangular diplomacy, Nixon and Kissinger would use China as a “counterweight” to the USSR, exploiting the rift between the two powers. [19] In talks with Chairman Mao and Premiere Zhou En Lai, the president stressed a relationship based on “common ground” between the two nations. [20] Again there is this recognition of a multipolar world, strengthening relations through a shared objective. He would go on to make the case that United States presence in Asia would be ideal for Chinese interests. [21] Much like Kissinger, Nixon evidently believed that the United States was still a key player in ensuring world order. The allure of the American commitment was strong as was the superpower’s credibility, it would seem.

Nixon and Kissinger were once more on a similar understanding when it came to the question of Vietnam. Prestige was at stake, and Nixon would not succumb to the North Vietnamese Army and Northern Liberation Front so easily. His Madman theory was the result, upping the escalation with bombings to pressure the North. Like Lyndon B. Johnson before him, Nixon saw “no good alternative” to ending the war other than with the use of more force. [22] Equally of concern to the President was an end to the war that saw a viable and autonomous South Vietnamese government. [23] This government would be solely responsible for its own destiny, which the United States would no longer have a stake in. These foreign policy directives correlated with Kissinger’s ideas on shedding responsibility and participation of the United States in relation to another nation’s problems. Yet these policies also aligned with Kissinger’s own writings on Vietnam specifically. Kissinger called for the establishment of an “indigenous political process”, with the Vietnamese people to decide their own fate. Simultaneously the United States would shift its top priority to evacuating troops from the region. [24]

In summation, Kissinger’s immediate influence within the Nixon administration was profound. Looking at Nixon’s rhetoric as well as intentions behind diplomatic meetings with China and dealings with Vietnam reveal as much. Once Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford left the White House it would appear that the hold of Kissinger’s foreign policy ideas began to waver. Jimmy Carter took aim at the now former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, directing criticism towards his ideas on spheres of influence. [25] But it was the next Republican administration under Ronald Reagan that saw United States foreign policy radically depart from the Kissinger ideal.

Ronald Reagan was the president of staunch anti-communism and morality. In his bid at the 1976 Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan heavily criticized Kissinger and Détente. [26] Détente was predicated on seeking stable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For Kissinger the policy of Détente was a necessity to keep the political equilibrium stable. In a briefing to Congressional Leaders in Washington, Kissinger said both powers were “compelled to coexist”. [27] A year later in another address Kissinger stressed the need for a “pragmatic conception of coexistence”. [28] Here he built off his proposal for finding commonalities in a fractured, multipolar world. Reagan would shatter this ideal with his proclamation of the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Once more there was a bipolar divide, a battle between ideologies with no compromise. Additionally Reagan saw the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as morally repugnant. He resented how a “nuclear war is aimed at people”, putting innocents in the crossfire. [29] Abandoning MAD, as Beth A. Fisher argues, was a “moral imperative” for the President. [30] Reagan’s ethical concern was instrumental in his move away from agreements such as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and his announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan’s moral drive that permeated his administration’s foreign policy was at odds with Kissinger’s amoral, power politics approach. Finally, officials interpreted the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the USSR thinking America weak.[31] Thus another reason for rejection of Détente came from the concern of American power and credibility. Ironically, this was an issue, as we’ve seen, that haunted Kissinger in his writings and direction on foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration was the resurgence of the American moral crusade and a refutation of Henry Kissinger’s realism.

Reagan’s successors, George Herbert Walker Bush, William Clinton and George W. Bush, would all follow in his footsteps. Of the three perhaps the president that truly differed from Kissinger’s thoughts was George W. Bush. A speech delivered by Bush at the start of the Iraq War in 2003 puts the classic American mission rhetoric on full display. The United States will bring peace, prosperity and freedom to other people.[32] This runs counter to proposed coexistence and furthermore goes against Kissinger’s warning of the futility of American hegemony in a multipolar world. Yet Bush did not look at the world through such a lens to begin with. This is exemplified in his speech days after the attack on The World Trade Centre, where he delivered an ultimatum to the nations of the world. “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”. [33] To Bush then, the War on Terror was a bipolar world conflict, in the same vein as the Cold War before and after the Nixon-Ford administrations. Subsequent intervention in the Middle East under the Bush administration would be Unilateral, against Kissinger’s plea of multilateral action.

The influence of Kissinger would begin to show prominently once more with America’s recent president Barack Obama. For Obama, the voice of Kissinger is heard in his approach to both the Islamic world and Cuba. Obama’s talk at Cairo University in 2009 touched upon the expected statements of American commitment. Of note though are his statements towards national autonomy for Middle Eastern governance and Human Rights. It is clear that he advocates for Human Rights, which he asserts are the desires of all people. But he turns away from the idea of America endowing other nations with its liberal structures. He instead suggests that no nation can or should impose any system of government on another. [34] This is a more realist approach in regard to US-Middle East relations. In concluding his address, Obama quotes from the Holy books of the three Abrahamic faiths, stating that world peace is “God’s vision”. [35] Implicit in this concluding remark is that Obama seeks resolution between religious, political and national institutions through a common drive for order. This is akin to Kissinger’s answer to a multipolar world where American hegemony poses significant limitations.

Obama’s opening up to Cuba is reminiscent of Kissinger’s foreign policy ideas as well. Remarking on Cuban-U.S diplomatic ties in late 2014, Barack Obama sought a change to previous policy. New relations would “advance shared interests” between America and Cuba. [36] Obama’s language is quintessential Kissinger, harkening back even to Nixon’s dealings with China. Interestingly enough the President even draws on the Nixon administration’s opening up to China as a way to make his case for changing policy towards Cuba. [37] Thus we find a resurgence of Kissinger’s key foreign policy ideas under President Barack Obama.

Kissinger’s thinking in American foreign policy is conflicted. In some respects he was a radical, splitting from the consensus in dealing with the late 1960s and early 1970s Cold War period. Power politics was the foundation for his thinking, taking on a realist perspective over an ideological one. He understood the world to be in upheaval, with the bipolar model no longer adequate. And he ultimately came to the opinion that such a fractured globe meant the end of the American mission. Making the world in America’s image would be difficult. Instead now was the time for negotiation, to seek peace through aligning national interests. The result was to maintain stability and bring balance to the equilibrium. It was also a time where America was paying too large a price, such as with rising troop deaths in Indo China. Therefore Kissinger opted for multilateralism and encouraged responsibility to be shed to other nations. All the while he didn’t entirely break the chain of America’s foreign policy history. Alongside his European understanding stood the American tradition of destiny. While not bestowing other people of liberal values, in Kissinger’s eyes America nevertheless served an important role in helping to shape the world of tomorrow. Then there was that intoxicating aroma of prestige and credibility for the nation, drawing Kissinger in as it had previous thinkers and administrations.

In evaluating his foreign policy ideas within the broader history of U.S foreign policy, Kissinger thus comes off as something of oddity. He is a man with a European mind and an American heart. As for the influence of his ideas in the history of American foreign policy his attitude to the American commitment naturally aligns to the presidents examined. The distinction lies in his realist reading of global affairs. Ronald Reagan and George W Bush operated in what they saw as a binary world, pursuing a moral mission over pragmatism. Kissinger made his thoughts known when serving in the White House and Richard Nixon was in agreement. Nixon espoused Kissinger’s views in his language to congress and the nation. The administration’s foreign policy initiatives, here looking at China and Vietnam, were structured on Kissinger’s perspectives. The administration acted off the notion of a politically multipolar world. As a consequence attempts to sue for peace were built upon the pursuit of common interests, limiting United States involvement, and empowering other nations with greater responsibility. The Kissinger ideals of the Cold War would find resurgence with Barack Obama in his dealings with the Muslim world and with Cuba, in both cases acting on pragmatic coexistence and searching for common ground on which to foster stronger diplomatic relations. While an icon to many, it would appear that Kissinger’s ideas are not so infectious in foreign policy discourse, with periods of life, decline and revival.

Bibliography

Primary

“Document 60: Report by President Nixon to Congress: Washington, February 18, 1970”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, edited by David H. Herschler and Louis J. Smith. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d60>. Accessed 20 September 2017.

“Document 192: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs: Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09-6:29pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, edited by Stephen E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d192>. Accessed 20 September 2017.

“Document 194: Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50-3:55pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, edited by Stephen E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d194>. Accessed 21 September 2017.

“Document 195: Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 5:58pm-6:55 pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, edited by Stephen E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. < <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d195>. Accessed 21 September 2017.

“Full Text: George Bush’s Address on the Start of War”, The Guardian, Tuesday 20 March 2003. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush>. Accessed 19 October 2017.

“Oath of Office and Second Inaugural Address”, The American Presidency Project, 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4141>. Accessed 20 September 2017.

“Remarks by the President at Cairo University”, The White House: President Barack Obama, June 4 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09> Accessed 19 October 2017.

“Text of George Bush’s Speech”, The Guardian, Friday 21 September 2001. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>. Accessed 18 October 2017.

“Transcript: Obama’s Remarks on U.S.-Cuba Relations”, The Washington Post, December 17 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/08366538-8612-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html?utm_term=.cbde8a7684cb>. Accessed 21 October 2017.

Kissinger, Henry A. “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy”. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp. 51-98. New York: Norton, 1974

Kissinger, Henry A. “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy”. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp. 9-50. New York: Norton, 1974.

Kissinger, Henry A. “SALT and U.S-Soviet Relations”. ”. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp.137-164. New York: Norton, 1974

Kissinger, Henry A. “The Nature of the National Dialogue”. ”. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp. 253-268. New York: Norton, 1974

Kissinger, Henry A. “The Spirit of American Foreign Policy”. ”. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp. 241-252. New York: Norton, 1974

Kissinger, Henry A. “The Vietnam Negotiations. In American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, edited by Henry A. Kissinger, pp. 99-136. New York: Norton, 1974

Reagan, Ronald. An American Life: The Autobiography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

Secondary

Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: Harper Collins. 2007.

Fisher, Beth A. “A Question of Morality: Ronald Reagan and Nuclear Weapons”. In Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981-1989, edited by Bradley Lynn Coleman and Kyle Longley, pp. 32-49. Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2017.

Hanhimäki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Mazlish, Bruce. Kissinger: The European Mind in American Foreign Policy. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976

Tannenbaum, Frank. The American Tradition in Foreign Policy. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955

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[1] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007) p.45

[2] See for example Frank Tannenbaum, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955)

[3] Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy”, American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) p. 56

[4] Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy”, p. 54

[5] Ibid. p. 60

[6] Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy”, American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) pp. 11-12

[7] Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy”, p.58

[8] Ibid. p. 65

[9] Ibid. p. 74

[10] “The Spirit of American Foreign Policy: Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 24, 1973” American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) p. 244

[11] Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy”, p. 57

[12] Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 491

[13] Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations”, American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) p 112

[14] Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger: The European Mind in American Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976) p. 212

[15] “Document 60: Report by President Nixon to Congress: Washington, February

18, 1970”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, ed. David H. Herschler and Louis J. Smith. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d60>.

[16] “Document 60: Report by President Nixon to Congress: Washington, February

18, 1970”. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d60>.

[17] “Oath of Office and Second Inaugural Address”, The American Presidency

Project, 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4141>.

[18] “Oath of Office and Second Inaugural Address”, The American Presidency

Project, 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4141>.

[19] “Document 192: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs: Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09-6:29pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Stephen E. Phillips. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d192>.

[20] “Document 194: Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50-3:55pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. by Stephen E. Phillips. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006). <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v17/d194

[21] “Document 195: Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 5:58 pm-6:55 pm”. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Stephen E. Phillips. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006) https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d195

[22] Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p. 107

[23] Ibid. p. 126

[24] Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations”, p. 131

[25] Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, p. 450

[26] Ibid. p. 443

[27] Henry A. Kissinger, “SALT and US-Soviet Relations”, in American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) p.141

[28] “The Nature of the National Dialogue” American Foreign Policy: Expanded Edition, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Norton, 1974) p. 259

[29] Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) p. 549

[30] Beth A. Fisher, “A Question of Morality: Ronald Reagan and Nuclear Weapons”, Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981-1989. Ed. Bradley Lynn Coleman & Kyle Longley (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2017) p.45

[31] Fisher, “A Question of Morality”, p. 36

[32] “Text of George Bush’s Speech”, The Guardian, Friday 21 September 2001 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>

[33] “Full Text: George Bush’s Address on the Start of War”, The Guardian, Tuesday

20 March 2003 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush>

[34] “Remarks by the President at Cairo University”, The White House: President Barack Obama, June 4 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>

[35] “Remarks by the President at Cairo University”, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>

[36]Transcript: Obama’s Remarks on U.S.-Cuba Relations”, The Washington Post, December 17 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/08366538-8612-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html?utm_term=.4668ebfae62a

[37] “Transcript: Obama’s Remarks on U.S-Cuba Relations” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/08366538-8612-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html?utm_term=.4668ebfae62a